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Supplementary Methods 
 
Subjects. Twenty-six healthy volunteers (17 female, 9 male) were recruited through Craigslist 
(www.craigslist.org), a popular online bulletin system. Demographics of the subjects are as follows: 
mean age: 39.2 +/- 5.7 years, range 29-55; marital status: 15 single, 9 married, 2 divorced (4 
subjects were parents); education: 18 college, 7 MS, 1 Ph.D.  
Informed consent was obtained using a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at 
Caltech. Subjects were required to have college education and to be 28-55 years old.  The age 
requirement was imposed to ensure subjects were not considered elderly, and that their moral 
character had been fully developed; the latter is speculated to be still developing possibly in the 
mid-20s (S1).  
Experimental Setup. Prior to the experiment, subjects read through a brochure with a description of 
the organization and a short biography of each of the 60 orphans.  Figure S1 contains a sample entry 
of one of the biographies.  Permission to use the images of the children was obtained from the 
organization prior to the experiment.  Images within each trial were matched for similar age, 
lighting conditions, skin tone, and facial expressions.  Location of the children, default group of 
children to take from, and a number of other variables were counterbalanced across trials. 
Subjects were then given instructions about the experiment and on how to make their decisions.  In 
particular, subjects were told that each group of 3 children was endowed by the experimenters with 
the $5, denominated in 24 meals per child, and that each child would appear only once in the 
experiment.  The purpose of denominating in meals is to give subjects an idea of the purchasing 
power of their contributions, as it differs markedly between Uganda and the United States—the cost 
of one month of food per child is approximately $5. This ensured that subjects did not utilize 
distribution strategies that averaged across trials. Images were standardized in size and presented on 
gray background.  Next, they were given instructions about the experiment and on how to make 
their decisions.  A total of 18 such trials were presented over the course of the experiment.  The 
amounts taken and the distribution of the amounts varied each trial (Table S1). Subjects also made 
decisions over positive donations (Give trials) over the course of the experiment.  We present the 
results for Take trials only in this paper.  Following the experiment, subjects completed a 
questionnaire containing demographic information and two pairs of moral dilemma scenarios.  
At the beginning of each trial, subjects see an animation in which a projectile is moving across the 
screen towards two groups of children (Movie S1, S2). The number of meals that each child could 
potentially lose is denoted next to the picture of the child. A directional lever in the middle of the 
screen indicates which group of children will lose the meals. During the display phase (Display, 7.5 
seconds) the projectile moves from the right of the screen towards the lever. After it crosses a dotted 
line, the subjects have 3.5 seconds to decide whether they want to switch the lever (Switch), hereby 
preventing the default group of children to lose any meals. After the projectile reaches the lever 
(Lever), the subject can no longer switch it, and the projectile continues to move towards the chosen 
group of children. After 6.5 seconds it hits the box surrounding the children (Hit), which remains 
highlighted for 3.5 seconds. After a blank screen of random duration (uniformly distributed on 1–3 
seconds), a 2 second feedback screen informs the subject how many meals each child had taken 
away (Feedback). Trials are separated by a blank screen of random duration (uniformly distributed 
on 5–7 seconds).  
Throughout the instructions it was emphasized to the subjects that their choices had real outcomes 
and monies would be donated to the orphanage according to their choices.  Subjects donated on 
average $87, for a total of $2,279, which was donated to the charity.   
Inequity Aversion Model. To characterize subjects’ choice behavior, we considered a model in 
which individuals trade-off between equity and efficiency linearly.  Efficiency is measured by the 
total number of meals in the allocation.  We denote Mc  as the sum of meals in the chosen 
allocation, Mu  that of the unchosen allocation, and marginal efficiency as ΔM = Mc − Mu.  To 
measure equity we used the Gini coefficient, which in addition to being the most widely used 
income inequity index, also has the appealing property of being scale and translation invariant.   
The Gini coefficient varies between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfect equity, and 1 is perfect inequity.  It 
is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution and the uniform distribution, 
where the Lorenz curve is the proportion of the distribution assumed by the bottom %x  of the 
values.  For example, for a dataset that includes the income of all households, every point on the 
Lorenz curve can be described as “the bottom %x  of all households have %y  of all income”.  The 
gini coefficient across households is determined by calculating the surface of the area between the 
uniform distribution and the Lorenz curve (Figure S2).  For discrete and unordered data the gini 
coefficient is calculated as the normalized mean difference between every possible pair of outcomes 
in the distribution 
∑
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where n is the number of realizations.  
We denote cG  as the Gini coefficient for the chosen allocation, uG for the unchosen allocation, and 
marginal inequity as the difference uc GGG −=Δ .   
We assume the utility function for subject i to be ui(x) = x
x ∈x
∑ −α i • gini(x), where x  is a vector 
of allocations for the children, and the parameter α  captures the weighting placed upon inequity.  
Individuals with higher α  are considered more inequity averse.  The additive nature of the function 
allowed us to create orthogonal regressors for efficiency and inequity, and to explore the possibility 
of separate neural encoding of efficiency and inequity. 
We denote the utility of the chosen allocation cU , the utility of the unchosen allocation Uu , and the 
marginal utility of subjects’ choices as 
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The intuition for the inequity aversion model is as follows.  Faced with an allocation of x1 = (-23, -0, 
-0), and x2 = (-0, -21, -5), the subject can choose between taking away 23 meals from child 1, or 
taking away a total of 26 meals away from children 2 and 3.  Although x2 takes away more in total, 
it is a more equitable allocation.  A purely equity minded subject would therefore choose x2, 
whereas one who is purely efficiency minded would choose x1.  For those who value both equity 
and efficiency, one can increase the appeal of x2 by making it even more equitable, e.g., ′ x 2  = (-0, -
13, -13), where x2 is a mean-preserving spread of ′ x 2 .  Amongst our subjects, 38% chose x2, versus 
46% for 2x′  when having to choose between x1 and x2 (or 2x′ ).   
The utility function makes the strong assumption that efficiency is valued linearly.  Good cases can 
be made for either diminishing or increasing marginal utility of meals.  The former is commonly 
assumed in the economics literature.  The latter may be justified if subjects believe they were 
maximizing the probability of survival, where the probability is a convex function of the number of 
meals, e.g., if the subjects believed there was some minimum number of meals needed for each 
child.  Diminishing marginal utility is also central to equity arguments in utilitarian theories of 
justice.  In the classic pie sharing example, two individuals with identical concave utility (e.g., 
u(x) = log(x)), the utilitarian solution maximizing the sum of individual utilities would give equal 
shares of the pie to both individuals.   
Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the utility function may be nonlinear in some way, 
we note that given the range of allocations in our experiment (0 – 24), the linearity assumption is a 
good approximation of standard utility functions used in applied economics (e.g., log, power, 
exponential).  The more strenuous test in the current experiment is whether there are regions that 
respond differentially to inequity and efficiency.  Future experiments with larger ranges of the 
outcomes are needed to assess these important questions. 
It is also possible that subjects used aspects of age, gender, or other variables in their decisions (e.g., 
1 subject stated in post-experiment questionnaire of favoring younger children).  Because all trials 
were matched carefully over a number of variables, including age, these effects are likely to be 
minimal. 
Inequity Aversion Model Estimation. The probability that the subject chooses an allocation is given 
by the logit or softmax formula, 
P(x1,x2;α,λ) = 1+ exp −λ u(x1;α) − u(x2;α)( )( ){ }−1. 
The parameter λ is the sensitivity of choice probability to the utility difference (the degree of 
inflection), or the amount of “randomness” in the subject’s choices (λ = 0 means choices are 
random; as λ increases the function is more steeply inflected at zero).  For individual fits sensitivity 
parameter λ was constrained to unity (the standard logit case) because of a lack of data to accurately 
estimate λ individually.  Because the range of subjects inequity aversion attitudes, the inequity 
aversion parameter for some subjects was on the boundary of the estimable parameter space [0, 23].  
To take into account this estimation problem, we used rank correlation in all correlational analyses 
with individual inequity aversion estimates, notably in our second-level fMRI analyses.   
Denote the choice of the subject in trial i by yi, where yi =1 if subject chooses the allocation x1, and 
0 otherwise.  We fit the data using maximum likelihood, with the log likelihood function  
yi log P(x1,x2;α,λ)( )+ (1− yi)log 1− P(x1,x2;α,λ)( ).
i=1
N∑  
The Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm (S2), implemented in Mathematica v5.2, was used to find the 
maximum.  Ten random starting positions were used and the iteration with the highest likelihood 
value was chosen.    
fMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis. Brain images were acquired on a 3T Siemens Trio.  High-
resolution T1-weighted scans (1mm x 1mm x 1mm) were acquired using a MPRage sequence.  
Functional images were acquired using echo-planar T2* images with BOLD (blood oxygenation-
level-dependent) contrast, and angled 30 degrees with respect to the AC-PC line to minimize 
susceptibility artifacts in the OFC.  MR imaging settings were as follows: repetition time (TR) = 
2000ms; echo time (TE) = 40ms; slice thickness = 3mm yielding in a 64x64x32 matrix (3mm x 
3mm x 3mm); flip angle = 90 degs; FOV read = 220mm; FOV phase = 100mm, series order: 
interleaved. 
Imaging data was preprocessed using SPM2, and included, in order, slice time correction, motion 
correction, coregistration, normalization to the MNI template and smoothing of the functional data 
with an 8mm kernel (S3).   
Random effects analyses were done in SPM2 (S3) by specifying a separate general linear model for 
each subject and pooled at the second level.  Two subject’s fMRI data were excluded due to motion 
artifacts.  First all images were high-pass filtered in the temporal domain (filter width 128s) and 
autocorrelation of the hemodynamic responses was modeled as an AR(1) process.  In the GLM 
model all visual stimuli and motor responses were entered as separate regressors that were 
constructed by convolving a hemodynamic response function (hrf) with a comb of Dirac functions 
at the onset of each visual stimulus or motor response.  Parametric modulations were added to the 
main regressors as interaction terms. 
Supplementary Results 
Behavioral Results 
 
The group inequity aversion parameter was α = 6.95 ±1.08.  Females were found more inequity 
averse (α female =10.26, αmale = 4.69, p < 0.06 two-tailed, Table S2).  The sample was unbalanced 
between gender (9 males).  Therefore, although the coefficient of females is almost double that of 
males, the difference not significant at the p < 0.05 level.  No age effect was found, nor was there a 
significant group time trend in inequity aversion attitude.  
fMRI Results 
 
Anatomical Location of ΔU region. The activation we observe falls in a midline structure that 
overlaps both the caudate head and the septal-subgenual region, also called Brodman 25 or ventral 
cingulated.  Of the 42 total voxels in the activation, 24 fall in the caudate and caudate head, and 13 
in the septal-subgenual/Brodman 25 region.  Given their close proximity, and the fact that both have 
been implicated in tracking social reward, a definitive classification is unlikely in the current study 
and the limitation of the spatial resolution afforded by fMRI.  Future studies are necessary to clarify 
this important point. 
Anterior vs. Posterior Insula. A potentially important difference between the studies is that the 
insula activation found here is further posterior than those reported on the Ultimatum Game.  We 
speculate that this may reflect functional differences between anterior/posterior insula.  In 
particular, hyperactivation of the posterior insula was found to be associated with social anxiety but 
not specific phobia or post-traumatic disorder (S4). Such negative social affective processing in 
posterior insula suggests it plays an important regulative role in sociality, and supports our view that 
posterior insula may provides an anticipatory negative affective signal in the context of a potential 
social norm violation. 
Cognitive Regions. Although we emphasize reward-related regions, cognitive processes are clearly 
involved, and have been implicated in a wide variety of tasks, including those involved in moral 
conflict monitoring (S5) and related executive processes (S5, 6).  Our focus on interactions with 
behavioral variables implicitly control for cognitive and emotional differences between the choices.  
Involvement of higher cognitive regions was apparent when we contrasted different stages of 
decision-making (e.g., Display vs. Hit).  These results show large and robust activations of conflict 
control regions such as anterior cingulate, executive control regions such as Brodmann areas 8 and 
10, and areas involved in integration of emotion and cognition such as the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Figure S5).   
Importantly, however, these regions do not exhibit significant correlation with measures of equity 
and efficiency.  Rather, we speculate that their role is likely to be in the domain of higher order 
reasoning and integration of emotions and reward processes, as exemplified by the finding that 
orbitofrontal lesion patients are strikingly utilitarian in their moral judgments (S7).  The interaction 
among these structures will be crucial to a better understanding of the complexities of distributive 
justice and moral decision-making.  These are important problems that are only beginning to be 
approached with a combination of data and ideas from a wide range of disciplines.   
Supplementary Discussion 
 
Relationship between Inequity and Risk. Central in the connection between measurement of 
inequity and decision-making under risk is the idea of welfare.  This is uncontroversial in the latter, 
and is traditionally meant to denote individual welfare, or utility. As pointed out in Dalton (S8), 
however, judgments of social welfare underlies the conception of any inequity measure.  
Furthermore, if we assume that the social welfare function is additively separable and symmetric in 
income, we would arrive at the following  
W = U(y) f (y)dy
0
y ∫ . 
This form is immediately familiar in its resemblance to the standard expected utility representation.  
In fact many of the concepts in decision-making under risk, e.g., second-order stochastic 
dominance, mean-preserving spread, have formally identical counterparts in measurements of 
inequity, e.g., Lorenz dominance, principle of transfer, respectively (S9).  The assumptions of 
additive separability and symmetry, interestingly, can in addition be derived axiomatically via an 
appeal to decision-making under risk (S10). 
Relationship to Ultimatum Game. Our finding is that insula activity is negatively correlated with 
the choice of equitable allocation, and not with inequity per se.  This is also the case with Sanfey et 
al (S11).  They found that unfair offers elicited greater insula activity.  These unfair offers, however, 
are also likely to be rejected.  The crucial point is that rejection yields the equitable allocation of (0, 
0).   
Higher level of insula activity is therefore correlated with rejecting the proposed offer (Figure S7), 
and thus with choosing the fairer allocation—note that offers of (5, 5) were never rejected in Sanfey 
et al.  This underlies the apparent paradox that although inequity itself is positively correlated with 
insula activity, it is negatively correlated with choosing of the inequitable offer.  For a comparison 
of activity of the insula and behavioral interpretations, see Table S4. 
An intuitive way to phrase this is that the negative emotions encoded in the insula are “biasing” the 
behavior towards the fairer allocation.  That statement includes claims of causality that obviously 
cannot be substantiated with fMRI.  Future studies with different experimental methodology, e.g., 
lesion patients, are needed to address this question.   
Our finding is also consistent with the connection between measurement of inequity and decision-
making under risk that exists in economic theory.  In studies of risk, risk perception is found to be 
increasing in insula activity (S12), whereas insula activity precedes riskless choices (S13), in much 
the same way as insula activity precedes equitable choices in the current study. 
Future Extensions 
 
Our work shows the importance of interdisciplinary work that combines different perspectives from 
neuroscience, economics, and philosophy, and points to a number of possible extensions.  We note 
three in particular.  First, and perhaps most obvious, is the issue of cultural differences.  Although 
fairness norms are common to most societies, substantial cross-cultural differences exist as 
measured through surveys (S14, 15) and tasks such as the Ultimatum Game (S16).  For example, 
Europeans have been shown on surveys to be more concerned about income inequity than 
Americans on average, but intriguingly, the rich in America are more concerned about inequity than 
their European counterparts (S15).  However, the larger question of cultural differences in fairness 
norms and how they impact neural function remains a major and largely unexplored issue.  
Another important and long-standing question lies in the role of extra-utility information in forming 
and shaping people’s distributive decisions.  A famous example due originally to Sen (S17) points 
out that a strict utilitarian would not take into account the source of the utils produced.  Therefore, 
whether redistribution comes about through taxation or torture should be irrelevant to the utilitarian, 
which runs counter to conventional intuitions about distributive justice.  Indeed, there is evidence 
that humans take into account perceived moral character in the Trust game (S18), but such tasks, as 
discussed earlier, can involve strategic considerations as well as other-regarding preferences.  A 
definitive study establishing the effects of extra-utility information in distributive justice therefore 
remains to be done.   
Finally, we note the importance of poverty—a concept related to but distinct from that of inequity.  
Poverty, even more so than social and economic inequity, is a pressing and desperate issue for many 
countries, and one that a number of organizations with substantial resources are dedicated to 
combating (e.g., World Bank).  On the other hand, even basic issues and definitions, perhaps none 
so more than “who is poor?” have remained unsettled and subject to politically contentious debate 
(S9). Our investigation of inequity provides some hope for shedding light on this difficult and 
important question.  In particular, the current literature distinguishes between absolute poverty (e.g., 
having enough sustenance) and relative poverty, a concept defined by norms and standards of a 
particular community (S9).  Future work can begin by investigating the neural basis of how 
individuals perceive and encode different aspects of poverty, the relative contribution of emotion 
and cognition in these different aspects, and, potentially, recommend strategies based on such 
findings for combating poverty and its consequences.   
Supplementary Tables 
 
Child 1 Child 2a Child 2b
-23 -13 -13 
-23 -21 -5 
-23 -12 -12 
-23 -21 -3 
-23 -12 -11 
-23 -20 -3 
-19 -11 -11 
-19 -17 -5 
-19 -10 -10 
-19 -17 -3 
-19 -10 -9 
-19 -16 -3 
-15 -9 -9 
-15 -13 -5 
-15 -8 -8 
-15 -13 -3 
-15 -8 -7 
-15 -12 -3 
Table S1: Allocation of meals. The first column denotes the number of 
meals taken from child 1, and columns 2 and 3 denote the number of 
meals taken from the group of 2 children.  Each line represents a 
different moral dilemma.  Order of trials in experiment are 
counterbalanced and do not follow order of entries in table. 
 
  Female Male 
Mean 10.26 4.69 
Variance 97.47 19.90 
Observations 17 9 
df 24  
t Stat 1.974  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.060  
Table S2: Gender differences in inequity aversion attitude assuming 
unequal variance. 
 
 ΔU  MC ΔG  
 Caudate L Putamen R Putamen L Insula R Insula 
ρ -0.419 -0.13 -0.07 -0.356 -0.410 
p-value 0.021 0.28 0.37 0.044 0.023 
Table S3: Spearman rank correlation coefficients and p-values (two-
tailed) between brain regions and subject-wise inequity aversion 
parameter. 
 
 
 High Insula Activity Low Insula Activity 
Sanfey et al. Reject offer -> (0, 0) Accept more unfair offer  
Kuhnen & Knutson Riskless choice Risky choice 
Present study Equitable allocation Inequitable allocation 
Table S4: Comparison of activations in studies on Ultimatum game, 
decision-making under risk, and the present study.  
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
36 4.68 0 -27 -78 -9 L Brodman 18/Fusiform Gyrus   
 4.27 0 -33 -60 -12 L      
  4.21 0 -30 -72 -15 L      
Table S5: Regions significantly correlated with ∆U during Display event 
(p < 0.001, cluster size k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
20 3.23 0.002 12 21 3 R Caudate Head/Anterior Cingualte 
 3.14 0.002 18 27 9 R  
11 3.21 0.002 -54 36 9 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
Table S6: Regions significantly correlated with ∆U during Switch event 
(p < 0.005, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
19 5.06 0 21 -3 -6 R Thalamus     
16 4.89 0 -39 30 12 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus   
10 4.48 0 21 -21 6 R Globus Pallidus    
19 4.38 0 -9 -12 6 L Thalamus     
Table S7: Regions significantly correlated with ∆U during Feedback 
event (p < 0.001, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
38 6.24 0 -9 -9 45 L Brodman 24/Cingulate Gyrus   
 4.15 0 -6 -15 54 L      
40 5.55 0 15 -15 36 R Cingulate Gyrus    
 5.07 0 12 -24 30 R      
36 5.48 0 30 -21 45 R Brodman 4    
 4.46 0 36 -18 54 R      
37 5.41 0 9 -21 54 R Medial Frontal Gyrus   
19 5.29 0 -12 -27 30 L Cingulate Gyrus    
28 5.18 0 51 -9 45 R Precentral Gyrus    
148 5.16 0 6 -66 15 R Posterior Cingulate/Precuneus    
 4.81 0 9 -42 -9 R      
 4.77 0 0 -57 9 M      
21 5.15 0 -39 -9 30 L Precentral Gyrus    
 3.8 0.001 -51 -9 39 L      
20 5.14 0 -30 -24 18 L Insula     
26 5.11 0 45 -45 6 R Middle Temporal Gyrus   
 4.69 0 45 -54 12 R      
19 4.85 0 30 18 3 R Cingulate Gyrus    
16 4.77 0 -33 27 -6 L Brodman 13/Insula    
12 4.72 0 -54 9 -15 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus   
15 4.64 0 54 -42 24 R Inferior Parietal Lobule   
10 4.58 0 -33 -39 15 L Superior Temporal Gyrus   
10 4.58 0 30 -24 12 R Brodman 13/Insula    
14 4.41 0 -27 -78 12 L Middle Occipital Gyrus   
  3.74 0.001 -33 -87 15 L      
Table S8: Regions significantly correlated with MC during Switch event 
(p < 0.001, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
14 3.93 0.001 18 -42 -36 R Cerebellum 
Table S9: Regions significantly correlated with MC during Hit event (p < 
0.005, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
17 4.44 0 15 18 57 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 
37 4.08 0 -18 54 6 L Medial Frontal Gyrus   
42 3.98 0 9 24 30 R Cingulate 
 2.9 0.004 9 12 24 R  
15 3.36 0.001 15 48 15 R Medial Frontal Gyrus   
 3.26 0.002 21 45 9 R  
Table S10: Regions significantly correlated with MC during Feedback 
event (p < 0.005, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
74 6.01 0 27 51 24 R Brodman 10    
31 5.4 0 -42 -42 -24 L Brodman 37/Inferior Temporal Gyrus  
20 4.79 0 12 57 15 R Medial Frontal Gyrus   
89 4.76 0 39 -27 21 R Brodman 13/Insula    
 4.03 0 45 -21 24 R      
80 4.45 0 -15 -54 9 L Posterior Cingulate    
 4.21 0 -9 -51 15 L      
64 4.28 0 -51 -66 21 L Brodman 39    
 3.66 0.001 -39 -60 12 L      
52 4.25 0 33 0 9 R Insula     
 3.51 0.001 42 -6 12 R      
99 3.89 0.001 60 -57 12 R Superior Temporal Gyrus   
24 3.59 0.001 -27 -3 12 L Insula     
28 3.54 0.001 9 -63 15 R Precuneus     
Table S11: Regions significantly correlated with ∆G during Display 
event (p < 0.002, k > 10). 
 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
26 4.26 0 60 -21 21 R Postcentral Gyrus    
12 4.16 0 -36 -3 12 L Insula     
31 4.08 0 42 0 -3 R Insula/Brodman 13    
 3.72 0.001 39 3 9 R      
11 3.74 0.001 0 -27 57 M Medial Frontal Gyrus   
Table S12: Regions significantly correlated with ∆G during Switch event 
(p < 0.002, k > 10). 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
5 3.95 0 21 15 45 R Brodman 8 
8 3.64 0.001 -48 -36 -18 L Brodman 37/Fusiform Gyrus 
7 3.4 0.001 -24 15 18 L Claustrum 
Table S13: Regions significantly correlated with ∆G during Hit event (p 
< 0.005, k ≥ 5). 
 
 
k T p X Y Z L/R Region 
17 4.89 0 -45 -6 12 L Insula     
29 4.77 0 -18 -75 21 L Brodman 31/Precuneus    
37 4.76 0 12 -57 0 R Posterior Cingulate/Cuneus    
 4.51 0 9 -63 6 R      
18 4.74 0 45 -9 12 R Insula/Brodman 13    
15 4.7 0 54 6 27 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus   
13 4.7 0 -51 3 33 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus   
11 3.69 0.001 -21 33 15 L Medial Frontal Gyrus   
Table S14: Regions significantly correlated with ∆G during Feedback 
event (p < 0.001, k > 10).
Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Figure S1: Example of a child’s biography (picture and full name 
available upon request). 
 
 
 
Figure S2: Graphical representation of the gini coefficient. 
 
 
Figure S3: Inequity aversion model where utility as a weighted sum of 
efficiency and equity, calculated using the group inequity aversion 
parameter α = 6.9.  Schematic shows three choices taken from the set 
used in the study.  Subject chooses allocation with (i) greater efficiency 
and greater inequity, such that ∆EFF = 3, ∆EQ = 0.128, ∆U = 2.10; (ii) 
identical efficiency and lower inequity, ∆EFF = 0, ∆EQ = -0.311, ∆U = 
2.18; and (iii) lower efficiency but lower inequity, ∆EFF = -1, ∆EQ = -
0.333, ∆U = 1.33. 
 
 
 
Figure S4: Distribution of inequity aversion parameter α in sample by 
the study.  The abscissa crosses at group estimate of α = 6.9. 
 
 
 
Figure S5: Regions that are differentially activated when the scenario is 
first displayed (Display) versus when the projectile touches the box 
around the children (Hit). (A) Display > Hit: Bilateral anterior insula and 
cingulate gyrus.  (B) Display > Hit: Bilateral putamen/globus pallidus. 
(C) Hit > Display: bilateral OFC and Brodman 6, 8, 9, 10.  All 
activations are at p < 0.001 and k > 10. 
 
 
Figure S6: Insula activity during Switch. (A) Bilateral insula activity 
during Switch (p < 0.005, k > 10).  (B) Dissociation between ∆G and ∆M 
in insula.  Insula activity is significantly negative correlated with ∆G (left 
panel) but not ∆M (right panel). 
 
 
 
 Figure S7: (A) Negative correlation between insula activity and 
acceptance of unfair offer in Ultimatum Game, (B) Negative correlation 
between insula activity and choosing of unfair offer in current study.
Supplementary Movies 
 
Movie S1: Switch Trial. Illustration of a trial where the subject switches the lever. Animation 
speed is increased for illustration purposes.  See Fig. 1 for actual duration of events and screens. 
 
 
Movie S2: No Switch Trial. Illustration of a trial where the subject does not switch the lever.  
Animation speed is increased for illustration purposes.  See Fig. 1 for actual duration of events 
and screens. 
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